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This paper presents a model in which the work schedule results from the equi-
librium between the ﬁrm’s decision and workers’ preferences. A technology
which organises the inputs in shifts has been considered for this objective, and
the workers’ preferences are deﬁned over the dierent feasible work-days. In
this context, the treatment given to the concepts of shiftwork and workday are
key innovations. The existence or not of capital constraints, the "fatigue"
eect, and the preferences regarding leisure determine the amount of inputs
utilized as well as the timing of work.
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1. Introduction
Working hours for the employees of a company usually coincide both
for economic, social, cultural, and environmental (light, temperature,
etc.) reasons, and to take advantage of positive externality that arises
from the potential for communication and co-ordination among em-
ployees who work at the same time. In the United States, 80% of
full-time workers begin their work-day between 7 and 9 in the morning
and end between 4 and 6 in the evening. Only 26% work on weekends,
see Weiss (1996). However, work shifts have allowed the increase in
operational time of installed capital and have had a great inﬂuence on
the increase in productivity of factors, see Foss (1997).
Our interest centres on analysing the determination of not only how
much work is performed but also when it is performed. For this, we
must take into consideration the timing of the workday. We shall
tackle this issue from the work system based on shifts, as this form
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of work organisation implies the existence of several work schedules
within the same period. For this we shall introduce two new elements
in the literature concerning these issues: the deﬁnition of workday and
the concept of shift. Consequently, a workday features a starting time
and duration (compared with the usual concept of a workday as a
number of hours). Concerning the concept of shift, we shall deﬁne it
as a group of workers who work the same workday and who jointly use
a capital stock. This allows us to consider the existence of workdays
that are dierent not only due to their duration but also based on the
moment they start (an 8 hour shift is not equally productive nor has
the same eect on the disutility of workers if it begins early in the
morning or at night) and, furthermore, this gives rise to dierent shift
systems concerning the number of workers, the capital stock used,
and the type of workday. This is an extension of the deﬁnition of
team used by Fitgerald (1998a), where work time was a variable of
quantitative importance, in the sense that workdays diered in the
number of hours worked, while, in the present model, a qualitative
aspect is introduced by incorporating another variable: the starting
time of the workday. Furthermore, salaries will depend on the type of
workday, both concerning its duration and its time of commencement.
Although, in the model, we consider that there are a great variety
of types of workday, there must be a ﬁnite number of types, which
lies within the framework of the indivisible work concept of Rogerson
(1988) and Hansen (1985), i.e., the agents oer work for one workday
with a pre-established duration or, alternatively, they do not work.
This leads to the fact that there cannot be variations in the hours
worked by an individual. In our model, the worker can choose from
among dierent working hours, which are established previously by
the ﬁrm to try to take advantage of the externalities that arise from
the co-operation and co-ordination between workers. An attempt is
made to show that the ﬂexibility of the workday is limited by issues
that are sometimes of a non-economic type, such as biological (circa-
dian rhythm), cultural, familial, etc. In equilibrium, each agent will
work for one of the said workdays, or he will not work. Indivisible
work implies the non-convexity of the set of consumption possibili-
ties and of the set of production possibilities, although convexity is
achieved with the introduction of employment lotteries. Following the
approach used by Hornstein and Prescott (1993) and Fitgerald (1998a)
of representing the economy in a McKenzie (1959) type context of ge-
neral equilibrium, the set of production possibilities becomes a convex
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cone and, furthermore, with identical agents it allows us to obtain a
result where some work and others do not; and, among those who do
work, not all perform the same type of workday. Our main contribu-
tion consists in deﬁning and introducing, in this context, the concept
of shift, as deﬁned above.
In the economic literature, the work schedule has received little at-
tention. Some exceptions are Hamermesh (1998, 1999) and Stemberg
(1991). Interest has centred more on issues related with overtime (es-
tablishment, bonuses, etc.) and, concerning shifts, references are not
very abundant: Calmfors and Hoel (1989), Bosworth (1991), Mayshar
and Halevy (1997), Dupaigne (2001), and Hornstein (2002). In this
literature we ﬁnd models where the relevant variable is the number of
shifts, deﬁned as the quotient between the time the capital is used and
the duration of the workday (Calmfors and Hoel (1989)), and models
that propose the existence of two shifts within the production func-
tion, Mayshar and Halevy (1997) and Hornstein (2002). In these cases,
ﬁrm output is the production obtained using capital and work during
the usual workday (which is usually deﬁned as the instantaneous out-
put multiplied by the number of hours of the said workday), plus the
output that results from assigning work to the same capital stock in
a second shift (in turn, instantaneous production multiplied by the
hours of that shift), therefore, the workday is extended when optimal.
In Bosworth (1991), an empirical study on the incidence of shifts in the
United Kingdom was performed and, in Dupaigne (2001), the number
of shifts extends the operational time on which the disutility of work
is deﬁned. In neither of them does the deﬁnition of shift coincide with
our proposal.
The pioneering work by Sargent (1978) considers the dierence in the
total costs of a company caused by increasing labour on a normal
workday (which the text sometimes calls ﬁrst shift) compared with
the alternative of increasing labour through overtime (called second
shift). It is a dynamic model where each period is a day and the daily
output is the sum of what is obtained based on the workers assigned
to performing a normal work-day, which is pre-established, and the
workers assigned to performing overtime, which is also given. The
adjustment costs between periods of workers who work normal work-
days are greater than the adjustment costs of the workers who work
overtime. In Mayshar and Halevy (1997), employment varies along
dierent margins: the total number of employees, their distribution
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on two discrete shifts, and the duration of the work-day. In the case
of ﬂuctuations in the price of output, labour will be assigned to one
shift or to two depending on labour productivity and costs. Hornstein
(2002) analyses the use of the production capacity and its relation
with the ﬂuctuations observed in the time over which capital is used
and in the time over which labour is used. For this, he builds a model
where the production function allows two shifts, but the capital-labour
ratio of the ﬁrst shift cannot be modiﬁed. Therefore, the response to
productivity shocks takes place by means of changes in employment
in the second shift.
The concept of shift is approached in a dierent way by Calmfors and
Hoel (1989). They study, in a static model, the eect of the elasticity
of substitution between the productive factors when the ﬁrm faces a
reduction in the workday imposed exogenously and the utilization time
of capital may increase through an increase in the number of shifts.
In their model, the decision variables are the total employment of the
ﬁrm and the number of shifts, which is deﬁned as the quotient between
the time over which capital is used and the duration of the workday.
The wage is the same for all employees, although its level will vary
depending on the number of shifts (it is supposed that all employees
rotate in the shift system). In papers with a less theoretical turn, espe-
cially applied to the automobile industry, one of the company decision
variables is the introduction or not of new shifts, see Bresnahan and
Ramey (1994), Aizcorbe (1992). Empirical research about capital op-
erating hours has been carried out in Foss (1997) and in Anxo (1995).
They both contain an elaborate analysis of the recourse to shiftwork
and its long-term trends.
On the other hand, the determination of work hours has been widely
treated in the literature from dierent approaches. Business cycle
models that centre on the endogenous determination of employment
and hours are provided in Kydland and Prescott (1991), Hornstein and
Prescott (1993), and Cho and Cooley (1994). Models that analyse the
co-ordination between workers as a determining factor for work-days
and employment are presented in Lewis (1969), Weis (1966), in a par-
tial equilibrium approach. Furthermore, models for determining the
workday in a context of general equilibrium with heterogeneous work
appear in Fitzgerald (1998b) and, also co-ordinated in teams, Fitzge-
rald (1998a). One question that has aroused interest throughout the
last decade has been the eect of the reduction of the workweek on job
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creation. Among the extensive literature on this issue, the reduction
is imposed exogenously in Fitzgerald (1998b), Marimon and Zilibotti
(2000), Fitzroy, Funke and Nolan (2002) and Rocheteau (2002), or is
the result of a certain tax on overtime, as in Osuna and Ríos-Rull
(2003).
The model that we propose explains the determination both of the
number of shifts and their schedule as a result of the joint decisions
by the ﬁrm and its workers. Therefore, it is a general equilibrium
model and it introduces the preferences of workers deﬁned over the
work schedule and the technology of the ﬁrm that organises the factors
into shifts. Following the economic literature about these questions,
we suggest diverse speciﬁcations for the functions that represent the
workers’ utility and the output of a shift, given that the model could
be developed under dierent assumptions. The levels of employment
and output are also determined, and an analysis of how they depend
on the length of the workday, in the face of changes in the preferences
concerning the work schedule, and the importance of the fatigue eect
or other variables aecting technology. All in all, our concept of shift
and, consequently, of workday, is a ﬁrst approximation to the idea of a
ﬂexible workday. We consider that the traditional system of working
time organisation, with a workday that begins and ends at the same
time for most employees, is changing in response to production needs
of new goods and services, technological developments, or even to the
appearance of new forms of social and family life organisation. Further
developments of the model will allow us to analyse these issues.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide some evi-
dence on work schedules. Section 3 describes the economy. Then we
determine, in Section 4, within the framework of a static competitive
equilibrium, the optimal number shifts and their features based on the
existing capital in the economy. In Section 5, we analyse the wages
and the employment required by each shift. Next, we examine how
preferences and technology interact to determine the optimal work
schedule. Section 6 analyses the importance of the available capital in
the determination of working time. Section 7 concludes.
2. Some evidence on work schedules
Hamermesh (1998) indicates, among his conclusions, the enormous
quantity of information available on the amount of work and leisure in
western economies compared with the scarce knowledge on timing. He
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bases his information on the only source that he considers appropriate
in the case of the United States (US), which is the data on the usual
hours when people start and ﬁnish work and which, for the years 1973,
1978, 1985 and 1991, were provided by the Current Population Survey.
With this, he elaborates indicators on the fraction of workers who are
working at each hour of the day and oers a more wide-ranging study
of the results in Hamermesh (1999). The main conclusion he reaches is
that work in afternoon and night shifts decreased considerably between
the 1970s and the 1990s and, nevertheless, work performed around the
normal work-day (from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) increased, more speciﬁcally,
from 6 a.m. and after 6 p.m. This reﬂects a tendency to increase the
work interval of the normal workday.
Bosworth (1991) analyses the evolution of the incidence of shifts in
the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1989. Throughout the period,
this system is used more in the manufacturing industry than in the
rest of the economy, and more so among manual workers than among
non-manual workers. The data for the economy as a whole oscillate
between 11.2% of workers on shifts in 1973 and 13.5% in 1989. The
highest ﬁgure is 15.3% in 1983.
Cette (1995) studies the evolution of shifts in France from 1957 to
1990, which is explained, in part, by the pro-cyclical nature of this
variable. The percentage of manual industrial workers who work on
shifts in 1990 was 34.1.
Foss (1997) elaborates a study about shiftwork and the changes in
weekly hours of capital use over long periods of time in US manufac-
turing industry. Manufacturing plants were working about 25% more
hours per week in 1976 than in 1929. From 1976 to 1988, weekly
operating hours increased by 4.1%. The rise in hours of capital use
has come about mainly because of an increase in shiftwork. In fact,
changes in average weekly plant hours over an extended period are
a reﬂection of new technology, a continuous process. However, that
change occurred earlier in the past century and some new technolog-
ical developments are associated with shorter average weekly capital
hours. In his study, Foss corroborates, as a cursory examination of
the statistics suggests, that plants in capital-intensive industries work
the longest hours, and that plants in labour intensive industries work
the shortest1. On the other hand, shifts are cyclical since ﬂuctua-
1 In spite of its limitations, the measure of capital intensity used was the ratio of
kilowatt-hours of all electricity consumed to wage earner man-hours.
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tions in demand may cause ﬁrms to alter their plants’ hours by adding
or dropping shifts. Premium pay is usually required for second and
third shifts because workers dislike working at other than conventional
daytime hours. But other variable costs, besides labour, and institu-
tional and social regulations may be included. In sum, one of the Foss’
study conclusions is that, other things equal, the more rapid the rate
of technological change, the greater the incentive to use up plant and
equipment in the physical sense in a given time period.
In an international comparative study, Anxo (1995) examines the re-
course to shiftwork in France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK and
the US. With regard to long-term trends, the analysis reveals a no-
ticeable increase in the incidence of shiftwork. The results of national
studies on the determinants of shiftwork stress both the close connec-
tion between the recourse to shiftwork and capital intensity, and the
signiﬁcance of ﬁrm size.
In the case of Spain, the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL) (Survey
on the Labour Situation) oers information on the percentage of work-
ers who work on shifts. The average percentage of workers whose com-
panies use shift systems, between 1998 and 2001, is of 33.5; and among
all workers, an average of 24.6% worked on shifts during the period
studied. The survey dierentiates between morning shift, afternoon
shift and night shift, and the distribution of workers between those
shifts was constant for all years: approximately half for the morning
shift, one third for the afternoon shift and one seventh for the night
shift. By sectors, the incidence of shifts is greater in the industrial
sector and almost inexistent in the construction sector. Speciﬁcally,
the average percentage for the 1998-2001 period of workers whose com-
panies used shift systems was 48.3 in the industrial sector, 33.7 in the
service sector and 3.3 in the construction sector. Furthermore, the
larger the size of the company, the higher the percentage of workers
who work on shifts, reaching 45.6 in the case of companies with over
250 workers (the average for 1998-2001). On the other hand, the ECL
classiﬁes workers based on the type of measures that would be adopted
in their company in the event of an increase in demand and by sector.
In this sense, according to data from 2001, the highest percentage of
workers work in companies that would opt for Contracting new work-
ers (74.8). The ﬁrms that would opt for Improved production capacity
represent 9.8% of workers; while the Increase in overtime hours would
aect 1.8% of workers. Alternatively, the Encuesta de Población Ac-
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tiva (EPA) (Labour Force Survey) includes, in the second quarter of
2001, a special module called Relaciones laborales especiales y condi-
ciones y horarios de trabajo (Special labour relationships and work
conditions and schedules), which states that 17.5% of wage-earners
work in a team that uses a shift system2 3. Their distribution among
the dierent shift systems, as deﬁned in this module, is: ﬁxed shift,
i.e., the employee does not change shifts (34.6%); morning, afternoon
and night shifts every day (20.8%); morning, afternoon and night shifts
from Monday to Friday (7.9%); morning and afternoon from Monday
to Friday (12.1%); day and night from Monday to Friday (0.8%); or
another type4 (23.9%). More information on the work schedule is given
by the distinction made in this module between ﬁxed entrance and exit
hours, which comprises 87.8% of wage-earners, and ﬂexible entrance
and exit hours5, which applies to 5.3% of them; the rest are included
in the category of another type, as in the deﬁnition of the shift system
(see footnote 3).
Finally, it is interesting to note, also for Spain, that the question of
workday ﬂexibility is dealt with by the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida
en el Trabajo (Survey on Quality of Life at Work) through three issues:
possibility of resting during the workday, modiﬁcation of entrance and
exit hours, and the possibility of taking a non-recoverable day o. In
2001, 33.8% of workers answered that they could never or hardly ever
take a rest during the work-day, 60.3% could never or hardly ever
decide the hour they start and end their work-day, and 45.6% lacked
the possibility of taking a day o without losing money or holidays.
2According to the EPA, work in shifts is deﬁned as a system where employees belong
to a group of people who replace each other to perform the same tasks at the same
place.
3The employees referred to in the module dier in number from the employees
according to the corresponding EPA, due to the lack of response of the module,
and they dier from the workers in the ECL as the deﬁnitions of the two surveys
do not coincide.
4This category includes: variable weekly schedule established by the employer,
schedule established by agreement with the employer, schedule established by the
worker and other non-described types.
5 In accordance with the EPA methodology, this category means that the entrance
and exit hour are freely determined, as long as a certain period of the day is covered,
which is compulsory, and the total number of hours per week is worked. This is the
case of many workers in the public sector.
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3. The shiftwork economy
Let us now describe the model. This economy lasts for one period
and it is populated by a continuum of people with measure 1. All
individuals are identical and each person has a time endowment of 1
that can be allocated to either work, k, or leisure, o = 1k, and n A 0
units of capital.
Preferences are deﬁned over consumption and working time, which
can be performed with dierent timing. The production is organized
in shifts consisting of a group of workers, using capital during one
type of workday. We represent this economy in McKenzie-type general
equilibrium language. Let a commodity point { be an element of the
Euclidean space O= For an agent the consumption set [ is a subset
of the commodity space O. Preferences over consumption bundles in
[ are represented by the utility function X : [ $ U. Production is
described by some aggregate production possibility set \ , which is a
convex cone in O. As all agents are identical and with measure 1, an
allocation [{> |] is feasible if { 5 [> | 5 \> and { = |.
3.1 Technology
Shiftwork production is modelled in the following manner. Output is
produced by a large number of production teams which can operate
in dierent shifts. This allows the extension of capital utilization for
a longer time period than a corresponding workday. We consider that
dierent shifts can operate dierent workdays, and workdays are dis-
tinguished by the number of hours and by the moment at which work
starts. So, we deﬁne a workday and a shift:
Definition 1: A workday, v, is characterized by a pair (w> k) where w
is the moment at which work starts and k is the length.
Definition 2: A shift is a group of workers, h, working during a
workday, v = (w> k), with n units of capital. A shift is characterized by
a four-tuple (w> k> n> h).
This way of deﬁning a shift is an extension of the plant in Hornstein
and Prescott (1993), where both the length of time over which a plant
can be operated and the number of workers operating it can be varied,
and a plant is characterized by (k> n> h)= In comparison with this model,
our shiftwork technology allows, in addition, a plant to be operated
for more than a workday, and dierent plants can be operated during
the same workday. This logically implies that more than a shift can
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use the same stock of capital if their workdays do not overlap. Con-
cerning the output of a shift, we distinguish between the instantaneous
production and the total production. The instantaneous production
function is i(n> h)> which displays constant returns to scale, but the
resulting output depends on the workday type that the shift operates.
Both the length and the moment of starting matter because we could
consider, for example, that the productivity in a 8-hour workday is not
the same during days and nights. So, the output of a type (w> k> n> h)
shift is: I (w> k> n> h) = i(n> h) j(w> k)> where j(w> k) measures the eec-
tive working time of a workday starting at w and ending at w+k. If the
set of feasible workdays is denoted by V, then j : V $ U+> multiplies
the instantaneous output of the shift that operates the workday (w> k).
Therefore, although both capital and labour are homogeneous, they
become dierent inputs depending on the shift they work.
3.2 Traded commodities
The model is in continuous time. However, it is simpliﬁed by assuming
that there is a large but ﬁnite number of possible workday lengths,
and consequently the number of possible starting times is also ﬁnite.
In this case, the set of possible workday lengths is denoted by K,
where K  [0> 1], K = {k0> k1> =====kQK}, with k0 = 0 and kQK = 16.
The lengths determine the possible starting times, so there is a set
W = {w0> w1> =====wQW }> W  [0> 1[, of possible starting times, with w0 =
0> w1 = k1> w2 = k2 or w2 = 2k1 depending on k2 ? 2k1 or 2k1 ? k2, and
so on, so that, apart from 0, each time a workday is ﬁnished another
can start with the same or dierent length, except at the end of the
period. Therefore, the set of feasible workdays, V, is ﬁnite, V  W{K,
and is given by:
V = {(w> k)@ w 5 W> k 5 K; w+ k  1 ; dqg k = 0 , w = 0}
Thus the set contains the following conditions: the length is restricted
by the duration of the period and the workday (0> 0) which implies the
length 0 is included. The number of feasible workdays is QV and it is
greater than or equal to the number of feasible starting times QW =
Introducing a ﬁnite number of dierent workdays creates an indivisibil-
ity because people cannot work, for example, 1/3 of an 8-morning-hour
6Considering the existence of working time regulation would imply deﬁning the
longest workday as a number less than 1, that is kQK ? 1.
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workday and 2/3 of a 6-evening-hour workday. An analytically use-
ful strategy for working with economies that have indivisibilities is to
allow people to randomize over dierent workdays using lotteries, fol-
lowing Rogerson (1988). In this way, people supply a lottery contract
that speciﬁes the probability of working dierent workdays, and they
will work only one workday depending of the lottery’s outcome.
The commodity space, O> is U2 ×P(V), where P(V) denotes the set
of signed measures on the Borel sigma algebra of V. An element of O
is given by (f> k> q), where f is the consumption good, k denotes the
services of the capital stock, and q is a measure over labour workdays.
One unit of capital produces one unit of capital services. When V is
a ﬁnite set, q is a vector and q(v) is the measure of type v workday
(with start at w and length k). The agent who chooses a point in O
receives f units of the consumption good in exchange for providing k
units of capital7 and some measure q over labour workdays.
3.3 Production possibility set
Let K and E be ﬁnite sets, and let M be VxKxE, the set of feasible
shifts, with generic element (v> n> h) and cardinality QM . We can index
shift types by m = {1> 2> =====> QM}. A production plan organizes the
distribution of inputs across shifts of dierent types, given that workers
are available for certain workdays, while capital is available at the
beginning of the period, and each time a shift ﬁnishes the capital
utilized is available for another shift. Let }m denote the measure of type
m shift operated, then the production plan is a vector of QM numbers,
} = {}1> }2> =====> }QM}> } 5 U
QM
+ > }m  0> that describes how the inputs
are allocated across shifts of dierent types. The production possibility
set, \ , is deﬁned as:
7The component k of the commodity space is not the same as the element n of
a shift because the latter is an element of a ﬁnite set. Thus they are denoted
dierently.
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\  {{F>N>Q} : wkhuh h{lvwv d surgxfwlrq sodq } 5 UQM+ vxfk wkdw
F 
X
m
}m i(nm > hm) j(wm > km)X
{m: wm $ w ? wm+km}
}m nm  N> doo w 5 W [1]
X
{m: km=k> wm=w}
}m hm  Q(v)> doo v 5 V }
The ﬁrst constraint says that the total amount of the consumption
good is less than or equal to the total output produced by all shift
types. The second constraint states that, for each feasible starting
time, the capital allocated across all the shift types with this starting
time or with the previous starting time but not ﬁnished yet is less than
or equal to the total capital available. The third constraint states that
the amount of type v workdays allocated across all shift types is less
than or equal to the total amount of type v workdays available. It is
immediate that \ is a convex cone.
3.4 Preferences
The speciﬁcation of this economy is completed by presenting individ-
uals’ preference ordering and their feasible consumption bundles. The
utility of a person choosing the commodity point { = (f> k> q) is given
by:
X({) = x(f)
X
v
q(v) y(v) [2]
where y : V $ U+ represents the disutility of working the workday
v, and : x : U $ U; y(0> 0) = 0> and limf<0 x>(f) =4. The function
x(f) is assumed to be continuously dierentiable and strictly concave.
Notice that
P
v q(v) y(v) is the expected disutility of working. The
consumption possibility set of an agent is:
[( n ) =
(
(f> k> q) : k  n> f  0> k  0>
X
vMV
q(v) = 1> q(v)  0
)
[3]
which contains the standard nonnegativity constraints and the condi-
tions that capital services are restricted by the capital stock endow-
ment, and q is a probability measure.
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4. Competitive equilibrium
The commodities traded are given by { = (f> k> q). Prices are in terms
of the consumption good. The rental price of capital is u. The wage
is a function z mapping signed measures into U. With a ﬁnite set of
possible workdays, z is a vector of prices, where z(v) is the price of
the type v workday. That is, if a person works the workday v with
probability 1, z(v) units of the consumption good are received.
4.1 The ﬁrm’s decision problem
The ﬁrm rents capital, employs workers for workdays of dierent types
and decides how to allocate these resources across all the shifts. On hir-
ing workers, the ﬁrm buys lottery contracts that specify the probability
of a person working workdays of dierent types, possibly including a
workday of length 0. The ﬁrm, which buys a large number of these
contracts, faces no uncertainty as to the number of workers who will
work dierent workdays. As all the individuals are identical, all will
sell the same lottery contract, but this does not mean that all people
work the same workday. In fact, each workday will be worked by a
measure of agents similar to the probability speciﬁed by the contract
of working that workday. Hence, given prices (u> z), the ﬁrm chooses
quantities (F>N>Q) to solve:
Pd{ F  uN 
X
v
z(v) Q(v) [4]
v=w= : (F>N>Q) 5 \ [5]
where Q(v) is the measure of workdays of type v.
4.2 Individuals’ decision problems
In this economy individuals purchase the consumption good and sell
capital and labor services to ﬁrms. The labor services are supplied in
the shape of lottery contract that speciﬁes the probability of working
dierent workdays. The amount an individual receives for a given
lottery contract does not depend on the lottery’s outcome, that is, on
05 - ANTONIO.qxd  04/01/2005  11:17  PÆgina 161
162 investigaciones económicas, vol xxix (1), 2005
the type of workday the individual works ex post, but the probabilities
of work supplied. The individual decision problem is:
Pd{ x(f)
X
v
q(v) y(v) [6]
v=w= : (f> k> q) 5 [(n) [7]
f  uk +
X
v
z(v) q(v) [8]
4.3 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is an allocation ({W> |W)
and a price system (u> z) such that:
i) {W maximizes X({) subject to { 5 [(n) and the budget constraint
(8).
ii) |W maximizes (4) subject to | 5 \ .
iii) {W = |W.
In this economy with one agent type, all individuals choose the same
commodity point, although this does not imply that all of them work
the same workday, since the chosen commodity point will involve ran-
domizing over dierent workdays. Also, the anonymous competitive
equilibrium and the anonymous Pareto-optimal allocation coincide.
Therefore, and as in Hornstein and Prescott (1993), we can study the
properties of the anonymous Pareto optima of this economy to es-
tablish properties of competitive equilibrium allocations. The social
planner’s problem is:
Pd{ X({) [9]
v=w= : { 5 [(n)> | 5 \> { = |
The characteristics of an anonymous Pareto-optimal allocation are de-
rived by analyzing a simpler equivalent problem. For this version, we
deﬁne k =n@h as the capital-labour ratio in a shift, therefore we no
longer distinguish between the organization of production, vector },
and the supply of workdays, vector q. So, the event m is characterized
by a triplet (w> k>k) which is interpreted as a shift operating the work-
day of length k, with starting time at w> and using k units of capital
per worker. There is a ﬁnite number, QM , of (w> k>k) triplets indexed
by m = {1> 2> ======QM}. The Pareto-optimal allocation then solves:
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Pd{
f> qD0
x(f)
X
m
qm y(vm) [10]
v=w= : f 
X
m
qm i(km > 1) j(vm) [11]X
m: wm$ w ?wm+km
qm km  n doo w 5 W [12]
X
m
qm  1 [13]
Given that i(n> h) displays constant returns to scale, the solution to
this problem has the same measure of agents working each workday
(w> k) on shifts with k units of capital per worker, and the same f as
does the solution to the original problem.
The constraint set deﬁned by [11]-[13] is closed, bounded and non-
empty (n A 0), and the objective function in [10] is continuous in f
and q; consequently, a solution exists.
We divide the Pareto problem into two subproblems: one that is a
linear program and one that is a nonlinear problem. Let the function
Y : UQM $ U be deﬁned as:
Y (q) = 
P
m qmy(vm)
This function returns the disutility of work associated with the working
plan q. Notice that Y (q) is linear in q, and for a given value of f, the
constraint set deﬁned by [11]-[13] is a convex polyhedral set. Then,
according to Int, and if we establish the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The slope of the contours of the function Y (q) does
not equal the slope of any of the bounding faces of the convex polyhe-
dron deﬁned by constraints [11]-[13], for any given value of f,
we state the following:
Proposition 1: there is only one distribution of workers across work-
days of dierent types which maximizes the welfare of the population,
because the solution to maximizing [10] subject to [11]-[13] is unique.
The number of triplets (w> k>k) receiving strictly positive mass is less
than or equal to QW + 2.
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Proof: Given the division of the Pareto problem, it is possible to
consider:
Z (F) = max
q D 0
Y (q) (P1)
v=w= : F 
X
m
qm i(km > 1) j(vm) (i.1)X
m: wm$ w ?wm+km
qm km  n doo w 5 W (i.2)
X
m
qm  1 (i.3)
Let Fmax denote the solution to maxqD0F subject to (i.1)-(i.3). Z (F)
is the smallest sum of the disutilities of working associated with pro-
ducing F units of output, and Fmax is the maximum feasible value of
F which can be produced. Linear programming results guarantee that
for 0  F  Fmax there exists a solution to (P1) which has at most
a number of nonzero unknowns equal to the number of constraints,
that is to say QW +2. Furthermore, assumption 1 guarantees that this
solution is unique. So, the original problem can be rewritten as:
Pd{fD0 x(f) +Z (f)
v=w : f  Fmax
where it is straightforward that the solution is Fmax given the conti-
nuity and strict concavity of x(f) and the concavity of Z . Associated
with this unique value of f is the unique q that solves (P1), which has
at most QW + 2 nonzero elements.
Hence, the Pareto optimal allocation (which must be an equilibrium
allocation) will have people working at most QW + 2 dierent shifts,
a number of shifts normally less than those feasible. The remaining
shifts will not be traded. The number of dierent shifts that will start
to run and the measure of workers allocated to these, in the problem
(P1), depends on the coe!cients both in the objective function and
in the constraints, as well as the parameter values in the constraints.
That is to say, it is a question of km > i(km)> j(wm > km)> y(wm > km)> and n=
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We can see this through the dual constraints or ﬁrst-order conditions
with respect to qm :
y(wm > km) + i(km)j(wm > km) 0  km(
l=ws31X
l=wm
1l) 2  0
; (wm > km >km) 5 M [14]
where 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (i.1);
each 1l is the multiplier on the constraint of the capital corresponding
to the starting time wl> that is, the constraints denoted (i.2). Then, the
condition [14] corresponding to a type m shift, with starting time wm and
ending time ws = wm + km > includes the multipliers associated with the
starting times from wm to ws31, given that, at the moment ws the capital
allocated to this shift can be used for another shift. The multiplier 2
is associated with the labour supply constraint. Equation [14] must
hold with equality if qm is strictly positive.
5. Determination of timing patterns
Now, we are interested in examining what type of workdays are de-
termined by the interaction of the individuals’ preferences and shift-
work technology. Individuals’ preferences over workdays determine the
shape of the wage schedules and the ﬁrm, then, chooses the shifts that
are going to be operated. Therefore, ﬁrst we look at the equations
[6]-[8], which show the individual’s maximization problem. From the
necessary conditions for a solution we obtain:
1y(v) + 2  z(v) iru doo v 5 V
1y(v) + 2 = z(v) li q(v)  0 [15]
2q(0> 0) = 0 [16]
where 1 is the multiplier on the budget constraint and 1 is its inverse.
2 is the multiplier on the constraint that an individual cannot place
more than one unit of probability across dierent workdays. The mul-
tiplier 2 is nonnegative and equals zero if a positive weight is placed
on working a workday of length 0. That is, 2 is zero if not everybody
is working in equilibrium. The condition in [15] holds with equality if
a lottery contract is traded that has a strictly positive probability of
working a workday v. Then, individuals will supply their work only on
the workdays that the wage reaches the level indicated by the left-hand
05 - ANTONIO.qxd  04/01/2005  11:17  PÆgina 165
166 investigaciones económicas, vol xxix (1), 2005
side of the equations in [15]. Given that 1 and 2 are determined in
equilibrium, these levels can be interpreted as the supply reservation
wages of the dierent workdays, and are deﬁned as
zv(v;W1> 
W
2) = 
W
1y(v) + 
W
2 [17]
where W1 and W2 are equilibrium values. The supply reservation wages
are the wages the ﬁrm must pay to attract workers at various workdays.
Now, we shall take a closer look at how workdays are determined in
the ﬁrm’s decision problem given in [4] and [5]. If we bear in mind
that the restriction of capital is applied to all starting times w, and
that the amount of work available to each workday will be employed
in it (the constraint about Q(v) will hold with equality), the necessary
conditions for a solution are:
i(nm > hm)j(vm) z(vm)hm  nm
l=ws31X
l=wm
l  0 iru doo m = (vm > nm > hm) 5 M
= 0 iru doo m zlwk }m A 0 [18]
u =
wQWX
l=w0
l [19]
where each l is the multiplier on the constraint that the capital is
restricted in the starting time wl and, if the shift type m lasts until
ws = wm+km > then ws31 is the multiplier on the constraint corresponding
to the previous starting time (as shown in the condition [14]). The
condition in [18] states that no shift type earns strictly positive proﬁts
in equilibrium, and the shift types that are operated generate zero
proﬁt. The condition in [19] states that the cost of a unit of capital
utilized sums up the costs resulting from every moment that this unit
is utilized. Each l is the unit price of capital utilized by the shifts
that start or are being operated at the moment wl= Therefore, as is
shown in [19] the unit cost of capital utilized by a shift is a proportion
of the total unit cost of capital, and depends on its operating time,
during which it is not available to other shifts that could overlap.
So, from [18] we can infer that the ﬁrm will operate the shifts in which
the production is equal to the cost, including salary cost and utilized
capital cost. Since the left-hand side of [18] is homogeneous of degree
one in (n> h), only the ratio n@h (denoted k) is determined for the
workday type (w> k) among the shift types that eectively work this
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workday in equilibrium. That is, in equilibrium, if more than one shift
operates during the same workday, the rate n@h is the same for them
given the constant returns to scale in function i . Deﬁne the proﬁt
function:
(w> k>k) = i(k) j(w> k) z(w> k) k un [20]
where un =
w+k31P
l=w
l. In this proﬁt function we can substitute the wage
for the supply reservation wage given in [17] and from the necessary
condition in [18] we can state that any shift type (wW> kW> nW> hW) that is
operated in equilibrium must satisfy:
{wW> kW> nW@hW} 5 arg max (w> k>k) [21]
v=w= : (wW> kW> nW> hW) 5 M
Then, in order to gain insight into the equilibrium patterns of timing
that arise in this model it is necessary to specify both the function
y(w> k)> that describes individuals’ preferences over workdays, and the
function j(w> k)> that measures the eective working time of a workday
starting at w and ending at w+ k=
5.1 Description of the preferences over workdays. The function v(t,h).
The function y(w> k) measures the disutility of working the workday
(w> k). Dupaigne (2001) provides a function  (·) that describes pref-
erences regarding leisure on a continuous time-scale, as a means of
modelling the idea that the value of leisure varies throughout the day.
Besides, in his article, the length of the working time is a constant
given by K, and the workers choose the time at which they start to
work, 0. Then, Dupaigne deﬁnes the value of foregone leisure during
this working time as:
0+KR
0
 ()g= We consider that preferences are
deﬁned over both the beginning and the length of the workday, and
following Dupaigne, the function y(w> k) sums up the instantaneous
value of leisure between w and w+k, which is measured by the function
 ():
y(w> k) =
w+kZ
w
 () g [22]
Now, we can assume dierent types of preferences over leisure and con-
sequently dierent preferences over workdays depending on the func-
tional form of  ()= That is, we propose the following:
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Case 1: The value of leisure is constant through out the day. The
worker cares only about the number of hours spent at work and does
not care how it is distributed over time. Moreover, the disutility is
linear in hours of work. We assume:  () =  > where the parameter
 represents the degree of aversion to work. A similar assumption
is considered in Weiss (1996), which analyses the cyclical pattern of
work.
Case 2: The value of leisure at each instant  is increasing and con-
vex through out the day. This case is consistent with the most usual
form of deﬁning preferences over leisure in the literature, for instance
in Fitzgerald (1998a) and Fitzgerald (1998b), Hornstein and Prescott
(1993) and Kydland and Prescott (1991), although in all of them the
relevant variable is the length of the leisure time and not its distribu-
tion. If the function y(w> k) is deﬁned by:
y(w> k) =
R k
0  ( > w) g and  ( > w) = (1   w)
31
where   0>  ? 1( 6= 0)> when we take w = 0 all the feasible
workdays start at the beginning of the day, as in the articles quoted
above. Then the resulting disutility of working the workday (0> k) is:
y(k) = [(1 k)  1]@
that is the same functional form for preferences used in FIta. On the
other hand, if w 6= 0, it is straightforward to show that y(w> k) is:
y(w> k) = [(1 k w)  (1 w)]@
which is increasing both in k and w.
Case 3: The value of leisure is at its minimum in the middle of the day
and at its maximum in w = 0 and w = 1= The function  () is symmetric
over the interval [0,1], with  (0=5) =  and  (0) =  (1) =  W= This
is the proposal in Dupaigne (2001), implying that one unit of leisure
at night increases the agent’s welfare more than one unit of leisure
during the day. People prefer to distribute the workday symmetrically
around midday, so that the disutility of work is minimized if an eight-
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hours-workday starts at 8 a.m. and ﬁnishes at 4 p.m, for example. We
assume:
 () =
(
yW  (y
W3y)
0=5  li  ? 0=5
y + (y
W3y)
0=5 (  0=5) li   0=5
[23]
which is shown in Figure 1 for the parameter values: yW = 1> y = 0=1=
5.2 Eective working time. Function g(t,h)
The function j(w> k) measures the eective working time of a work-
day starting at w and ending at w + k> and jointly with the instanta-
neous production, determines the total production of a shift, that is:
I (w> k> n> h) = i(n> h) j(w> k)= In other studies about working time the
length of the workweek usually enters in a Cobb-Douglas production
function, and the eect on the production obviously depends on its
coe!cient in the function. Some of these studies deal with a tech-
nology that is linear in hours and workers are not subject to fatigue
(Fitzgerald (1998), Hornstein and Prescott (1993)). Others consider
that total hours and not the breakdown into hours per worker and
FIGURE 1
The timing of the workday
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employment is what matters (Osuna and Ríos Rull (2003) treats both
cases). In addition, some of them include a variable measuring the set
up time, Hansen (1985) describes it as warm up time, and this set up
time, therefore, reduces the eective working time corresponding to
whichever workweek8. On the other hand, Mulligan (1998) provides a
model of labour supply such that individuals choose which work ses-
sion to work and how long each will last. Then, Mulligan deﬁnes an
instantaneous productivity |() function which is negatively related to
a function that can be interpreted as the fatigue caused by extended
intervals of work, and depends on the history of time used up to that
instant. And with respect to eective working time too, Booth and
Ravallion (1993) deﬁne an e!ciency hours index where the number
of e!ciency hours obtained from a given number of clock hours is a
strictly concave function of hours worked, thus there is a warm-up pe-
riod (the function increases) followed by a fatigue period (the function
decreases).
Considering all these questions, we deﬁne the eective working time in
a general form that allows the introduction of dierent assumptions.
Although the possible starting times take place at discrete intervals:
w0> w1> w2> ===, an indicator of the eective working time that wears on
from w until w+ k in continuous time is:
j(w> k) =
w+kZ
w
|() g [24]
where |() measures the instantaneous behaviour of the indicator.
Then, following Fitzgerald (1998a) or Hornstein and Prescott (1993),
|() must be constant and equal to 1, in order to get a linear tech-
nology in hours; following Osuna and Ríos-Rull (2003) or Fitzgerald
(1998b), in fact, j(w> k) should be j(k) = k#> since the variable w is not
considered and dierent values of # can be interpreted as a dierent
elasticity of labor services with respect to hours. However, we are in-
terested not only in the number of hours but also in their distribution.
There are studies on the health and safety problems associated with
shiftwork. These problems stem from the fact that working irregular
hours can be in conﬂict with biological rhythms and could aect perfor-
8Kydland and Prescott (1991), Fitzgerald (1998b) and Osuna and Ríos-Rull (2003)
assume that the set up time enters the utility function rather than aecting labour
productivity. They are in this way modeling the commuting costs.
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mance too (see Folkard and Monk (1996)). We propose the following
as an appropriate speciﬁcation of |():
|() = 1J()> J() 5 [0> 1] [25]
J0()  0> J00()  0> 0    
J0()  0> J00()  0>     1
where J() represents the fatigue which is increasing with  from  ,
but falls from 0 to  . We assume that  is the usual starting time.
Then, the eective working time diers from clock hours because of
the fatigue eect, which is intensiﬁed by the length of the workday and
by starting times dierent from  . To illustrate, the function |() is
shown in Figure 1. The plot is for the function:
|() =
½
2 + |1 li  ? 
2  |2 + |3 li   
[26]
with the parameter values: |1 = 3=36> |2 = 2=8225> |3 = 1=8225 and
 = 1@3=
5.3 The optimal workday
The characteristics of the workdays that arise in the competitive equi-
librium are analysed from the proﬁt function [20]. Conditional on n@h>
we are looking for the solution to the problem of maximizing (w> k>k)
by choosing of w and k. That is:
(wW> kW) 5 V> vxfk wkdw (wW> kW)  (w> k) ;(w> k) 5 V
and by substitution of y(w> k) and j(w> k) for [22] and [24] respectively,
the funtion (w> k) results:
(w> k) = i(k)
w+kZ
w
|() g  W1
w+kZ
w
 () g [27]
The set of feasible workdays V is ﬁnite. Then, in order to propose
the necessary conditions for an optimal workday we deﬁne, ﬁrst, what
are the necessary conditions if W = [0> 1) and K = [0> 1], and the set
V is a rectangular subset of U2= Secondly, the existence of a workday
belonging to V that satisﬁes these conditions. With a continuum of
feasible workdays, the necessary conditions are:
W1  (w) = i(k) |(w) [28]
i(k) |(w+ k) = W1  (w+ k)
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that is, the optimal moment to start is the instant in which the mar-
ginal utility of leisure, weighted with the marginal utility of consump-
tion, coincides with the marginal productivity at that instant, and the
same concerning the optimal moment to ﬁnish.
If the preferences over leisure are constant through out the day, as we
deﬁne in case I, the optimal instant to start to work is when i(k)|(w) =
W1  (assuming w ? > that is, when |(w) is increasing). The workday
ﬁnishes when i(k)|(w+ k) = W1  (assuming w+ k A )=
When we consider the functions  and | deﬁned in [23] and [26] re-
spectively, the optimal workday is between the points wW and wW + kW
shown in Figure 1, because both the condition [28] and the second
order conditions are satisﬁed in those points (in the plot it is assumed
W1 = i(k) = 1)). Then, if the workday (wW> kW) that results from [28]
belongs to V> the proﬁt is maximized in that shift, and the other shifts
are ranked below.
However, since the set of feasible workdays is ﬁnite and following lin-
ear programming results, it can be shown that an equilibrium in this
economy is characterized as follows: the measure of the each workday
m that will be worked is }m = q(m)hm > the stock of capital used in it will be
q(m)nmhm > and output will be q(m)i(n@h> 1)j(m)= In addition, it is inferred
that the existence of one or more than one workdays, that is the ex-
istence of dierent working schedules in the same period, depends on
the amount of capital available in the economy. Then:
a) There is only one shift type (wW> kW>kW)> with q(wW> kW) = 1 if:
a.i)  (wW> kW>kW) A (w> k>k) ;(w> k>k) 5 M
a.ii) n@kW  1
b) There are more than one shift type (wW> kW>kW)> (w0> k0>k0)> ===> with
q(wW> kW)> q(w0> k0)=== ? 1 if:
b.i)  (wW> kW>kW) A (w0> k0>k0) A===(w> k>k) ;(w> k>k) 5 M
b.ii) n@kW ? 1> n@k0 ? 1> ===
where workdays can be partially overlapped.
It follows that the existence of either only one shift or more than
one is a question of the relationship between the available capital and
the capital-labour ratio. Next, we analyse how this ratio is chosen,
although this implies altering the problem slightly.
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6. The economy without shifts
In this modiﬁed environment, output is produced by plants in which
both the workday can be performed and the capital-labour ratio uti-
lized can be varied. A plant type is deﬁned by (w> k> n), and the
set of feasible plant types, M , is a rectangular subset of U3> where
n 5 [0>N 0]> w 5 [0> 1]> k 5 [0> 1]= However, it is not possible to run shifts,
in the sense that each unit of capital can be utilized only in a plant
and during one workday, and when that workday ﬁnishes the corre-
sponding capital cannot be utilized again. We let } be the measure of
people who work in each plant type; so, the social planner’s problem
is:
Pd{
f> }
x(f)
Z
M
y(w> k)g} (P2)
v=w= : f 
Z
M
i(n)j(w> k)g}
Z
M
n g}  n
Z
M
g}  1
which contains a nonlinear problem and a linear program. Although
this is a semi-inﬁnite linear program, an optimal measure assigns pos-
itive mass to no more points than there are constraints9. From the
necessary conditions, the plants with } A 0 (which can be, at most,
three) must satisfy:
y(w> k) + 0i(n)j(w> k) 1n  2 = 0
a similar condition to [14] except that there is only one multiplier
associated to the sole constraint on capital. If we deﬁne:
Y (w> k> n) = y(w> k) + 0i(n)j(w> k) 1n  2
to maximize Y (w> k> n) by choice of w and k> this implies satisfying the
conditions shown in [28], so that 0 = 1@W1 , and from those conditions
we get: wW(n)> kW(n)=With the functions  () and |() given in [23] and
[26] the optimal workday will be:
wW(n) =
(
|1
2 +
[[0i(n)|1+&]2340i(n)yW]
1@2
+&
20i(n) li w ?? 0=5; n n
0 li n ? n
9Hornstein and Prescott (1993).
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wW(n) + kW(n) =(
|2
2 
[[0i(n)|2+&]2340i(n)(0i(n)|33&0)]
1@23&
20i(n) li (w+ k) A 0=5 ; n n
0 li n ? n
where: n A 0 depends on the parameter values, & = (y
W3y)
0=5 and &
0 =
2y  yW=
In those expressions for wW and (wW + kW)> it is proved that CwCn ?
0> C(w+k)Cn A 0> that is, the optimal workday is increasing in n> in the
sense that it starts earlier and ﬁnishes later. Figure 1 shows the con-
ditions in [28] for two values of n> where | denotes i(n)|(), with
i(n) = 1> and |0 denotes i(n1)|(), being n1 A n.
Now, we deﬁne: Z (n) = Y [wW(n)> kW(n)> n] so that the value of n which
maximizes Z (n) is allocated to the plants with } A 0= The question
is that if the value of n maximizing Z (n) is less than or equal to n>
the constraint over capital in (P2) is not binding, and all the mass will
be placed on a single plant m1 = (w1> k1> n1)> }m1 = 1= We can show a
su!cient condition that ensures the solution to (P2) has positive mass
on two points:
Proposition 2: if the following condition
i 00(n)j(w(n)> k(n)) + i 0(n)
Cj
Cn
A 0 [29]
is satisﬁed for the value of capital n> then the equilibrium places posi-
tive mass on two points.
Proof10. Under the conjecture of all the mass being placed on a sin-
gle point, the value of n1 must be n. If the condition [29] is satisﬁed
the second derivative of Z (n) is positive, and this contradicts n max-
imizing Z= But we have already shown that points receiving positive
mass must maximize Z . This establishes the result.
The left hand side in [29] contains the derivative of the instantaneous
marginal productivity of capital, i 00(n)> (which is negative) multiplied
by the eective working-time, plus the instantaneous marginal produc-
tivity of capital, i 0(n), multiplied by the eect of capital on the optimal
workday, CjCn = Then if for the total amount of capital available in the
economy, the increasing eect on the working-time compensates for
10The argument utilized in proposition 2 and its proof is based on Hornstein and
Prescott (1993), although the condition is obviously dierent.
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the decreasing eect on the marginal productivity, the capital-labour
ratio chosen, nW> will be greater than n= Therefore, the measure allo-
cated to that plant , }W> will be less than 1, and the other feasible point
is w = 0> k = 0> n = 0, given that Y (0> 0> 0) is a local maximum of Y . In
this type of solution, not all the agents will be working because of the
gains in production generated by the utilization of capital-intensive
technology.
Now, if we translate this result into the economy with shiftwork, and
under the condition deﬁned in [29], the capital-labour ratio utilized
during the optimal workday is such that nnW ? 1= Therefore, the econ-
omy is included in case b, there is more than one shift type, and people
will perform more than one workday type.
7. Concluding remarks
The traditional coincidence of working time, like the regular work-
day, the standard workweek (Monday-to-Friday), or else the summer
holidays in August that we observe for most workers obey multiple
reasons. The fact that most people are working simultaneously has
inﬂuenced the economic, social, and environmental conditions to the
point where employees and employers prefer to continue this pattern.
Working during evenings or nights is generally considered unpleasant.
The analysis of the timing of work requires the deﬁnition of a tech-
nology in which not only the amount of work to be undertaken, but
also when, is relevant. For this purpose, the shiftwork technology we
have described seems suitable. In addition, the context of general
equilibrium adopted in the model allows us to examine the interaction
of workers’ preferences over work schedules and that shiftwork tech-
nology.
The existence of one shift or more than one, and the corresponding
workdays, is conditioned by the available stock of capital and the
capital-labour ratio utilized. In the appendix we show an easy ex-
ample of the model, which ilustrates these relations. Eectively, when
the capital-labour rate increases more workdays are performed and
the capital utilization time is extended. With respect to the timing of
these workdays, it is a question of workers’ preferences and the pro-
duction function. The framework presented is a ﬁrst approximation to
the determination of the work schedules. We have proposed a broad
enough model which can be useful for addressing some other issues
related to the timing of work like commuting cost, adjustment cost to
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implement new shifts, and overtime taxation. All these issues could
aect the equilibrium of workdays. Moreover, the change of prefer-
ences over schedules driven by new life-styles (for example to reconcile
the family and working life), or the change of the production function
can change the notion of a regular workday. In this sense, a shorter
workday or, if the period considered is a week, a 35-hours workweek
could be the equilibrium result.
Appendix 1
Through an easy example, we show the results that the model predicts
and the relevance of some key parameters. In order to obtain the
numerical simulation we assume that the preferences over workdays
are given by the functions deﬁned in subsection 5.1 and shown in [22]
and [23]. The function j(w> k) is given by the expressions [24] and [26]
in subsection 5.2. In addition, the instantaneous production function is
Cobb-Douglas, i(n> h) = Dnh(13), and the utility function is x(f) =
log f, both of them standard functional forms and used in FIta too.
The parameter values are: yW = 1> y = 0=1> |1 = 3=36> |2 = 2=82> |3 =
1=82>  = 1@3> D = 3>  = 0=36.
The set of workday lengths is predetermined and limited to three ele-
ments: K = {0> 1@4> 1@3}> that is, the standard length, 1/3 (8 hours),
and the other is more reduced, 1/4. The set of feasible moment to start
is derived fromK, and is given by W = {0> 1@4> 1@3> 1@2> 7@12> 2@3> 3@4}=
In this scenario, if we solve the planner’s problem, we get the results
listed in Table 1. The length of the workday chosen is always 1/3, but
if there are no capital constraints, the optimal workday starts at 1/4,
that is, earlier than the standard workday (1/3, 1/3). For values of
capital-labour ratio higher than n, which are utilized if Proposition 2 is
satisﬁed, more workdays are performed. It is a matter of deﬁning the
feasible workdays in a suitable way that allows increasing employment
and output.
TABLE A.1
Results from the numerical example
Wages per Wages
Workdays Employment workday per hour Output
k/k > 1 (1/4, 1/3) 1.0 0.07 0.22 0.78
k/k = 0.5 (0, 1/3) 0.5 0.17 0.53 0.76
(1/3, 1/3) 0.5 0.06 0.19
k/k = 0.1 (0, 1/3) 0.1 0.07 0.21 0.31
(1/3, 1/3) 0.1 0.02 0.07
(2/3, 1/3) 0.1 0.07 0.21
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Resumen
Este estudio presenta un modelo de determinación del horario de trabajo como
resultado del equilibrio entre las decisiones de la empresa y las preferencias
de los trabajadores. Para ello se considera una tecnología ya que organiza los
factores de producción en turnos de trabajo, y se deﬁnen las preferencias de
los trabajadores acerca de trabajar las diferentes jornadas posibles, deﬁniendo
los conceptos de turno y jornada de forma novedosa en este contexto. La
existencia o no de restricciones de capital, el efecto "fatiga" y las preferencias
por el ocio determinan la cantidad de factores empleada y en qué horario.
Palabras clave: Utilización del capital, equilibrio general, trabajo por turnos,
horario de trabajo.
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